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ABSTRACT

Cultural Compatibility: Economic
Development in Eastern Europe

by

Daniel Brilliant, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2011

Major Professor: Dr. Diana Thomas
Department: Economics and Finance

Recent work in the field of development economics has demonstrated a
correlation between certain cultural traits and economic prosperity, reinforcing the theory
of institutional stickiness. Notable works have served to quantify and clarify the
connection between informal cultural institutions and formal governmental institutions.
Due to a lack of data, however, studies which examine the link between culture and
prosperity have omitted former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe from their data sets.
With the availability of new data, analysis for this region has now become possible,
yielding surprising insights into the sources of economic development. This paper
demonstrates that the cultural indicators established in the literature do not have quite the
same economic impact on former Soviet countries as on other countries of the world,
suggesting that different factors are driving the success or failure of these transitioning
economies.
(43 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Cultural Compatibility: Economic Development in Eastern Europe
The objective of Daniel Brilliant’s research is to explore the relationship between
culture and economic prosperity in the former communist countries of Eastern
Europe. Learning why some of these countries do better than others is of interest in
discovering what causes a country’s economy to grow in general. Knowing the causes of
economic growth helps in determining what policies, if any, can be adopted by a country
to help promote economic growth. Some have theorized that government policies are at
the heart of prosperity. Others have speculated that cultural factors play a large role in
determining if such policies will be effective.
This study expands upon research performed in the development economics
literature by adding data from countries which have been historically excluded. Earlier
studies usually omitted these transitioning economies due to a lack of available data, but
as time goes on data becomes more and more accessible. The major contribution of this
paper in terms of data collection is the incorporation of measures used to gauge judicial
power from the social sciences literature to fill gaps in the economics literature data.
The analysis suggests that certain cultural measures which are used in
development economics literature are not significant contributors to the divergence in
economic outcomes in Eastern Europe. In light of this, future research should look to
other sources to understand what drives economic prosperity in Eastern Europe and
perhaps in the world at large.
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INTRODUCTION

The term “Washington Consensus,” coined by John Williamson of the Institute for
International Economics in 1989, depicts a set of ten policy prescriptions for developing
countries to improve their economy. These policies were a conglomeration of the policy
advice of major international and Washington based organizations. The original intention
of this position was to help developing countries in Latin America escape grinding
poverty. It is only natural that when the Soviet Union fell, Washington Consensus policy
initiatives, prominent in the world of development economics at the time, would be
applied to the newly founded countries of Eastern Europe. The popular phrase of the
time was “getting the institutions right,” (Williamson, 2009) signifying the idea that it
was most important to formulate an appropriate mix of formal governmental rules in
order to create a vibrant free market economy. The results of these attempts surprised
many experts. The transition from a controlled socialist economy to a liberalized system
was difficult for each nation.
Results thus far have varied greatly between countries. For example Poland grew
from a GDP per capita of $3,097 in 1990, measured in constant 2000 USD, to $6,570 in
2010, more than doubling in twenty years. Russia, on the other hand, grew from $2,602
in 1990 to only $2,923 in 2010. (World Bank) Although they have all been experiencing
generally positive growth for the last two decades, they are all increasing at very different
rates. What could explain this difference?
The developmental transition of these formerly socialist economies is of great interest
in understanding the determinants of economic development in the rest of the world.
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Since the former soviet countries were all subjected to similar command and control
economic systems which ensured similar outcomes in terms of GDP per capita and
standard of living, it is important to determine how the different institutional structures
which have been adopted by each nation since the fall of the Soviet Union have impacted
their divergent development. Much of the research in development economics has
neglected extensive review of the former Soviet bloc countries due to a lack of reliable
data. Now that new data sources have emerged study of this region has become possible.
In part due to the mixed results of the Washington Consensus reforms, a new theory
has emerged in the field of development economics which describes how tension between
formal institutions and informal institutions determines how well a set of policies will be
received. Boettke, et al (2008) lays out the theory of “institutional stickiness” which
states that how effective formal government policies are going to be is determined in a
large part by the compatibility of those constraints with local informal rules and customs.
Formal institutions are considered to be exogenous while informal institutions are
endogenous, spontaneous and self-organizing. When formal institutions run counter to
local informal institutions, inefficiencies are created and the potential for unrest emerges.
Even when formal institutions attempt to replace informal institutions while achieving the
same ends (such as encoding into law a rule which is already a social norm) there can be
inefficiencies due to misallocations by the government as well.
An extension of this theory supported by Williamson (2009) is that the most
economically developed countries are associated with strong informal cultural rules
which are conducive to economic growth, such as a trust of others. On the other hand
strong formal rules which constrain the power of the government, and thus should be
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useful in limiting arbitrary and economically detrimental policies, are actually associated
with lower economic development. She suggests that the mismatch of formal and
informal institutions is not as important for development as the actual strength of the
institutions themselves. Informal institutions simply trump formal institutions, better
constraining behavior in a way that benefits development. This theory of institutional
stickiness is central to the methods used in my analysis, particularly the additional
insights provided by Williamson (2009).
This paper seeks to address how informal institutions, measured by certain aspects of
culture (which represent informal institutions) as described by Tabellini (2010), interact
with formal institutions in transitional countries, in order to see what impact this
interaction has on economic development. I find that these post-communist countries do
not follow the same patterns found in the rest of the world, as reported by Williamson
(2009), and that the cultural traits described by Tabellini are not significant in explaining
the variations in economic wellbeing present in this region of the world. This suggests
that there are other forces at work which have a more significant impact on economic
outcomes and that more research is required to discover what those forces are.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

One strand of the literature in the field of development economics explains the mixed
results of the Washington Consensus efforts with the theory of institutional stickiness as
described by Boettke, et al (2008). This theory postulates a vital connection between the
informal institutions of a host country and the formal institutions. Specifically, the theory
posits that if the formal institutions run counter to the informal institutions then the
formal policies will be less likely to take hold or be effective. The theory also allows that
formal institutions can affect informal institutions but that this process is slow.
Works such as Tabellini (2010) and Williamson (2009) expand upon this theory of
institutional stickiness and seek to flesh out and quantify the nature of the connection
between informal and formal institutions. Tabellini's measures of culture, which consist
of segments of the World Value Survey: Inglehart et al (2000), are correlated with
economic prosperity, controlling for a series of other important indicators. His work
suggests that there is a causal relationship from culture to annual per capita GDP in the
regions of Western Europe. This work provides the measures used for informal
institutions in subsequent papers such as Williamson (2009) and this paper. It also
establishes a list of four specific cultural traits which are correlated with economic
prosperity. There are three indicators he uses which are positively correlated with GDP
per capita: trust of others, a sense of control over one's life, and the importance of
teaching respect and tolerance of others to children. There is also one variable used which
is negatively correlated, the importance of teaching obedience to children.
Williamson (2009) takes data from a broader set of countries than Tabellini
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(2010). Her results suggest that certain arrangements of informal and formal institutions
are better for economic performance than others. Specifically, the average performance
was highest for those countries which had well developed informal institutions. Also,
strong formal institutions had a negative effect, both for those countries with weak and
strong informal institutions. These results show that the formalization of informal rules
can be detrimental to economic development and that informal institutions are better at
inducing economically beneficial behavior.
As a guide for how to measure formal institutions I follow Glaeser, La Porta, LopeesDe-Silanes, & Shleifer (2004). They posit that in order to truly measure institutions, as
defined by North (1981), many of the more commonly used institutional metrics in the
development economics literature are not adequate. Since they are constructed using de
facto outcomes, not de jure rules, they are biased by short term events, such as election
results and the capricious but economically beneficial policies of dictators which are not
necessarily reflective of more sustained institutional trends and constraints.
For the measurement of formal institutions I also defer to La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer (2004), who establish the importance of judicial independence
and constitutional review as institutional indicators of economic prosperity. Their data
has since been widely used in the literature. Because their indicators were based on data
available in 1995, they overlook countries in Eastern Europe which were considered
transitional at the time. Due to this gap in the data I look to works in the political science
literature for a suitable proxy, specifically Smithey & Ishiyama (2000).
The indicators used in Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) were used to construct a
dependent variable in order to determine the factors which affect judicial formation in
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post-socialist countries. The variables that they use for determining judicial power
combine measures of judicial independence and constitutional review. These variables are
constructed very similarly to those in La Porta, et al (2004) in that they are de jure
measures based on constitutional provisions. Though they do not measure exactly the
same aspects of each country's constitution, they are close enough that a reasonable
comparison can be made.
Another work from the social sciences literature, Johnson & Berrett (2011), which
lays out a practical framework for strategic cultural analysis for the intelligence
community, suggests that the relationship between culture and institutions may be too
complicated to be sufficiently described quantitatively. The results of this paper coincide
with this idea, and there are likely other cultural factors which have a strong impact on
economic outcomes. Indeed the same cultural traits which create a positive environment
for growth in one region may not have the same effect in another region. The cultural
measures employed in Tabellini (2010) only measure certain norms among the
population, and neglect other important factors. For example, there may be a cultural
norm that places a taboo on ambition or the accumulation of profit. Similarly there may
be a perceptual lens that labels any western institution or business as untrustworthy,
damaging the potential for foreign trade. These sorts of issues are not sufficiently
addressed by current metrics of informal institutions present in the literature. As the
findings of this paper suggest, future endeavors would be benefited by looking at the
broader spectrum of cultural indicators present in the social sciences literature to measure
informal institutions.
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DATA

The nineteen countries in my data set are not present in the related literature, so it is
worth explicitly mentioning them. They include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. All of these
countries are conspicuous for having been subject to a relatively uniform centrally
planned socialist economic system for several decades. The notable exception is
Slovenia, which enjoyed a comparatively high degree of economic autonomy and was
exempt from many of the rules which governed other nations in this sample. Due to this
outlier effect, Slovenia is excluded from some portions of my analytical work so that
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of institutional change in the aftermath of a
planned economy. The general results, however, remain unchanged with or without
Slovenia. Since the data for Slovenia may be of use in future works by others, it is
included in table 3 of appendix A along with my complete data set. The associated
descriptive statistics are located in table 2 of the same appendix.
The method for quantifying formal and informal institutions in this paper follows
those used in Williamson (2009). Formal institutions are measured using four indicators
recommended by Glaeser, et al (2004),1 since they measure legal constraints and are not
bias by short run outcomes. The Database of Political Institutions (DPI)2 provides the
information for proportional representation and plurality. Both of these are dummy
1

These include plurality, proportional representation, constitutional review and judicial independence.
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh (2001)
3
The 2004 referendum was focused on the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and executive constraints,
not legislative ones.
2
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh (2001)
4
Waves included are 1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009.
5
Specifically it measures whether the partial correlations among variables are small.
2

8
variables where 1 represents the presence of the trait in question and 0 its absence. In the
case of plurality, this measures the presence of a “winner takes all” election system. A
country is considered to have proportional representation if candidates are elected based
on the percent of votes received by their party. The variables proportional representation
and plurality are created by averaging the scores for each country from 1996 to 2009.
Since these are measures of constitutional provisions they aren't likely to change over
time. There are, however, some notable exceptions. In the case of Latvia, Poland and
Romania, which joined the European Union in 2007, their governmental structure was
changed the year that they obtained membership. Russia, Ukraine and Macedonia also
changed their constitutions during the sample period. In the case of Ukraine the scores
reflect the ratification of the Ukrainian constitution in 1996 and the major reforms
implemented by Victor Yanukovich in 2004. For Russia, these changing scores are the
result of political reforms during the Putin presidency. Macedonia’s scores for these
variables changed due to laws passed in 2004-2005 which changed the political landscape
as part of a power sharing agreement. In one case, Belarus, there was a section of years
for which data was not available from 1998-2004. Since the numbers remain the same
for the period before the gap as after, and since there were no notable changes regarding
the variables of interest in the constitution of Belarus during this time 3 the average is
simply taken using the available data, excluding the missing years.
The data used in the literature for constitutional review and judicial independence
were generated by La Porta, et al (2004) using de jure measures present in each country's

3

The 2004 referendum was focused on the reelection of Alexander Lukashenko and executive constraints,
not legislative ones.
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constitution. Since their data set excludes the countries of Eastern Europe, an alternative
source is used to construct these variables. Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) employs a series
of six de jure measures of various aspects of judicial power in their analysis. The first
two (as well as another indicator which is used as an independent variable in their paper)
encompass aspects of constitutional review powers granted to the judiciary, the average
of which constitutes my variable constitutional review. The remaining four address
judicial independence and the average of their measures make up my variable judicial
review. For a more detailed explanation of how these variables are constructed and how
they compare to those used in La Porta, et al (2004) see Appendix B. All four formal
constraints represent constitutional measures designed to constrain government, and,
therefore, higher scores imply stronger formal institutions.
Informal institutions are measured using the method laid out by Tabellini (2010)
which uses four measures from the World Values Survey, Inglehart, et al (2009).4 The
first of these measures is the percentage of respondents which answered the question
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?” with the response “Most people can be trusted.” The
other possible response was, “You can never be too careful.” This variable is called trust.
The second and third variables are constructed from the question “Here is a list of
qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider
to be especially important? Please choose up to five.” The potential responses include:
tolerance and respect for others, leadership, self-control, thrift, determination, religious
faith, unselfishness, obedience, and loyalty. The percentage of respondents which
4

Waves included are 1981, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2008, and 2009.
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included tolerance and respect for others in their answer is coded as tolerance. The
percentage of respondents which included obedience in their answer is coded as
obedience.
The final metric is derived from the question “Some people feel they have completely
free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no
real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means
“none at all” and 10 means “a great deal” to indicate how much freedom of choice and
control in life you have over the way your life turns out.” The variable control is the
unweighted average of the responses from each country. Trust, Respect, and Control,
according to the prevailing theory present in the literature, should be positively correlated
with economic performance. Obedience is meant to be negatively correlated with
economic performance.
From the four measures for formal institutions a composite indicator is constructed
using an unconditional average. An identical approach is used to create a composite
score for informal institutions. Williamson (2009) employs principal component analysis
to derive these composite indicators, but this method appears to be inappropriate for my
data set. The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Bartlett's Test of
Sphericity indicate that factor analysis is not well suited for construction of either
composite variable. Specifically, the KMO test measures the sampling adequacy.5 As a
rule of thumb, test results should be greater than 0.5 for factor analysis to be productive.
For both variable sets, however, the KMO test result was less than 0.5, thus satisfactory
analysis is in question.
5

Specifically it measures whether the partial correlations among variables are small.
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Bartlett's test of sphericity indicates the level of certainty that the correlation matrix is
an identity matrix, which determines if the factor model is appropriate. If the test result is
significant (i.e. <0.05) then the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity
matrix can be rejected, which implies that the factor model is appropriate. If the test is
not significant (i.e. >0.05) then the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an
identity matrix cannot be rejected, implying that the factor model is not appropriate. The
formal institution composite indicator failed this test as well. Thus I resort to simple
averaging, as used by La Porta, et al (2004), Smithey & Ishiyama (2000), and Tabellini
(2010) in variable construction.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

To determine the nature of the relationship between formal and informal institutions a
simple OLS regression is performed using the following specification:
Y = α+βX + u

In this equation Y is the vector of formal institution composite scores, X equals the
vector of informal institution composite scores, and u is an independent and identically
distributed error term. A positive relationship between X and Y suggests that informal
and formal institutions are complementary. A negative relationship, however, lends
strength to the idea that there are frictions created when formal constraints displace

Formal Institution Score

informal ones. As indicated in figure 1, there is a clear negative relationship.
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Informal Institution Score
Figure 1: Comparison of formal and informal institutional measures.
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Figure 2a: Williamson (2009) grid.

Figure 2b: Quadrant analysis grid.

Composite Analysis

In order to better flesh out the relationship between formal and informal institutions,
each country is plotted in a chart. Williamson (2009) employs a three by three grid to
separate the countries by relative institutional scores as shown in figure 2a. Williamson
designated those countries with an institution composite score above six as “strong” and
those below three as “weak.” Since all of the countries in my sample have a composite
informal institution score between three and six, this method does little to demonstrate
the relative effects of informal institutional structures in this case. Therefore, I use a
quadrant system to compare relative institutional strengths as shown in figure 2b. The
median is used as the point of demarcation between quadrants due to the relative lack of
variability in the data set. Countries with a formal institution score above the median
appear in the northern sectors; countries with an informal institution score above the
median appear in the western sectors. This method is justified for two reasons. First, the
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criteria by which the strength of a set of institutions is determined are arbitrary. Second,
the composite score is unit-less and only useful for relative comparisons.
The average GDP per capita is then taken for the countries in each quadrant, which
allows a general comparison of the relative level of prosperity as it relates to the strength
of their institutions. GDP per capita is measured in constant 2005 USD adjusted for
purchasing power parity for the year 2010. Figure 3 shows the countries and the average
2010 GDP per capita for each quadrant. In these figures, cells are shaded to make
analysis easier. Darker cells have a higher GDP per capita; lighter cells have a lower
GDP per capita. As mentioned before, Slovenia is excluded from the averages due to the
autonomy which it enjoyed during the Soviet period. For reference, figure 4 is a
reproduction of the results found in Williamson (2009). In order to compare these results
it is again important to point out that the four sectors present in the reproduction figure
from Williamson (2009) represent the four corners of a nine sector grid. Though our
methods differ enough that a direct comparison is not appropriate, the general direction of
the results are notably distinctive.

Strong
Weak

Informal Institutions

Formal Institutions
Strong

Weak

Hungary, Russia,
Ukraine

Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,
Macedonia, Poland

($12,238)
Armenia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Georgia,
Lithuania, Romania

($12,446)
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Moldova, Slovakia

($12,398)

($12,096)

Figure 3: Relative comparison of formal and informal interaction and the
resulting average GDP per capita.
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Strong
Weak

Informal Institutions

Formal Institutions
Strong

Weak

Canada, New Zealand

Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Netherland, Norway, Sweden

($23,452)
Pakistan, Philippines,
Uganda, Zimbabwe,
Singapore

($28,659)
Columbia, Nigeria, Peru,
Portugal, South Africa, Turkey

($6,662)

($7,672)

Figure 4: Relative comparison of formal and informal interaction and the
resulting average GDP per capita, reproduced from Williamson, (2009).

These results are close to those of Williamson (2009), but with one prominent
exception. Williamson finds that countries with strong informal institutions are the
leaders in economic performance. For any given level of informal constraints, a higher
formal institution composite score had a negative effect. Thus, the best performing sector
is the Northeast one, representing strong informal and weak formal institutions. This is
followed closely by the Northwest sector (strong formal and strong informal institutions)
and then less closely by the Southeast sector (weak formal and weak informal
institutions) and the Southwest sector (weak formal and strong formal institutions). Her
results indicate that there are frictions created by formalizing informal constraints and
that informal constraints are a much better way to ensure economic prosperity.
In my analysis, however, on average the two strongest performing quadrants are
the Northeast (weak formal and strong informal institutions) and Southwest (weak
informal and strong informal institutions) quadrants. This would imply that the mismatch
of institutional strengths is indeed beneficial. This could mean that informal and formal
institutions are fair substitutes for each other. When both are strong there are
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inefficiencies due to conflicting institutions. When both are weak, performance suffers
even more due to a lack of institutional support.
Also, the difference between average GDP per capita scores for each quadrant is
much smaller than in Williamson (2009), with the top quadrant only outperforming the
lowest by about three percent. This is not surprising since all of the countries in this
sample are far more similar than those in Williamson (2009).
It is worth pointing out that the sector which had the greatest variability of GDP
per capita in Williamson’s analysis was the mid-informal, strong formal sector. This
cohort included some of the richest and poorest countries of all. If a comparison is to be
made using Williamson’s metrics and those in this paper, half of the nations in my data
set fall into this volatile category. About the countries which lie in this range Williamson
said:

This category {mid informal, strong formal} suggests that an institutional arrangement can
promote economic progress in one country but not in another, making it difficult to predict
success.

Indeed, this seems to be the case with the countries examined in this paper. This sort of
ambiguity only serves to highlight the need for more research into this area. It may also
be possible that in this region the four cultural traits defined by Tabellini have a
distinctly different effect than they do in other regions.

Component Analysis

To further explore this result, each measure of culture is examined separately to
better determine how each variable affects the result. The average culture score has
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surprisingly low variability, but it is not due to a lack of variation for any given
component variable. Indeed figure 5,6 figure 6,7 and figures 7-108 show that this
particular set of variables happen to cancel out each other's effects in such a way as to put
the averages in a small range close to the mean. Comparison of each culture

tolerance
obedience
trust
control
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belerus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 5: The relationship between culture measures for each country.

Tolerance

Obedience

Trust

Control

Tolerance

1.000

0.424

0.063

0.013

Obedience

0.424

1.000

-0.080

0.243

Trust

0.063

-0.080

1.000

-0.744

Control

0.013

0.243

-0.744

1.000

Figure 6: The correlation matrix of the informal institution measures.

6

Figure 5 - a graph showing the relationship of the four culture measures for each country, demonstrating
that each country has very different component scores which tend to cancel each other’s variance. This
pulls the composite score closer to the mean.
7
Figure 6 - the correlation matrix of the culture variables. This reinforces the information found in figure 5.
8
Figures 7-10 - a series of scatter plots which show the relationship between each culture measure and the
formal institution composite score. Each scatterplot demonstrates far greater variability for the scores of
each component culture measure than is present in the composite variable. Compare to figure 1.
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Figure 7: Comparison of formal institutions and tolerance.
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Figure 8: Comparison of formal institutions and trust.
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Figure 9: Comparison of formal institutions and obedience.
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Control as average of responses

Strong
Weak

Informal Institution Control

Figure 10: Comparison of formal institutions and control.

Formal Institutions
Strong
Weak
Armenia, Croatia, Czech
Macedonia, Moldova,
Republic, Lithuania,
Slovakia
Romania
($13,968)
($10,256)
Georgia, Hungary, Russia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Ukraine
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Poland
($13,308)
($10,316)

Figure 11: Relative comparison of the variable control and informal
composite score and the resulting average GDP per capita.

measure to the formal institution score reveals that each variable has a different,
sometimes countervailing effect. Figures 11-14 show the quadrant based analysis for
each informal institution measure, one at a time.
These results suggest that there are other exogenous forces, beyond this model's
specification, which modify the effect of each variable, effectively changing the impact
of each cultural trait. Tabellini's work focuses on Western Europe, where the
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Strong
Weak

Informal Institution Tolerance

Formal Institutions
Strong

Weak

Armenia, Hungary,
Russia, Ukraine

Belarus, Estonia, Latvia,
Poland

($10,388)
Croatia, Czech Republic,
Georgia, Lithuania,
Romania
($13,910)

($14,860)
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Macedonia, Moldova,
Slovakia
($10,234)

Figure 12: Relative comparison of the variable tolerance and informal
composite score and the resulting average GDP per capita.

Strong
Weak

Informal Institution Obedience

Formal Institutions
Strong

Weak

Hungary, Romania,
Russian, Ukraine

Belarus, Macedonia, Poland,
Slovakia

($11,911)
Armenia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Georgia,
Lithuania
($12,692)

($13,046)
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Moldova
($11,686)

Figure 13: Relative comparison of the variable obedience and informal
composite score and the resulting average GDP per capita.

Strong
Weak

Informal Institution –
Trust

Formal Institutions
Strong

Weak

Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine

Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland

($14,537)
Armenia, Croatia,
Georgia, Hungary,
Romania
($10,591)

($13,382)
Latvia, Macedonia,
Moldova, Slovakia
($10,926)

Figure 14: Relative comparison of the variable trust and informal
composite score and the resulting average GDP per capita.
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cultural traits which he designates have the effect which he lays out. My results suggest
that in different cultural contexts, the same cultural traits might not have the same effect
on economic performance.
While the variables tolerance and obedience follow the same pattern as is present
in the composite analysis, the other variables, trust and control, both follow their own
sequence. This indicates that a strong informal ethic of tolerance and respect for others
benefits economic performance when formal institutions are weak. In the absence of
strong informal tolerance, formal institutions benefit development.
Obedience, according to Tabellini (2010), negatively correlated with economic
prosperity, but those quadrants with a strong obedience score outperform those with a
weak score on average. In Tabellini (2010) obedience was used as a proxy for the degree
of hierarchy in society. According to his theory, the more hierarchical a society, the less
prosperous it was likely to be. Using this interpretation, more hierarchical societies
perform better when constraints on government are weaker. Less hierarchical societies
do better when there are more constraints on government. This result seems to accord
with the idea that when cultural traits mismatch institutions there are losses due to
frictions, but when they coincide, there are benefits. A hierarchical society would tend to
do well when the hierarchy is codified into law, whereas a more horizontally integrated
society does better with a more constrained government and greater flexibility to selforganize.
The results for trust suggest that trust for others has a positive impact on
prosperity, but that the relationship with formal institutions is more nuanced than with
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tolerance. It would appear that countries whose citizens possess a strong sense of trust
for others benefit more from strong formal institutions, while those nations whose
citizens do not trust others do not derive such a benefit from strong formal constraints. It
is possible that citizens of those countries with strong formal institutions find it easier to
prosper thanks to the constraints on government which help prevent cronyism. Whereas
those who trust others less tend to do better in an environment where there are fewer
constraints on the government and interactions with others are more likely to be
constrained by the state. This result seems quite counter intuitive unless one is familiar
with some of the cultures and governments in this region of the world.
In the case of control the results are polarized in the opposite direction from trust
and obedience. Countries with citizens who have a strong sense of control over their
lives perform best in a system with strong formal constraints on government, since such a
system tends to help remove formal barriers to entrepreneurism. For those citizens who
feel they have little control over their lives, a system with fewer checks on government
power is more beneficial.

Robustness Checks
Due to the relatively simple nature of this analysis, and following Williamson’s
methods, I perform a series of robustness checks. First, a new variable is created which
is the ratio of formal and informal scores. A score less than one implies stronger formal
institutions relative to informal. A score greater than one suggests the opposite is true.
This new variable is then regressed on GDP per capita to demonstrate the relationship
between formalization of society and economic performance. Figure 15 shows, in

23
accordance with the findings of Williamson (2009), a negative relationship. This
suggests that as formal institutions displace informal ones, there are losses due to

Ratio of formal and informal
scores

inefficiency.

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

log GDP per capita 2010, adjusted for PPP in constant 2005
USD

Figure 15: Relative institutional strength and economic performance.

Next, several OLS specifications are run to check robustness which are
represented in table 1. The log of GDP per capita in 2010 is regressed on the formal
composite index, the informal index, the ratio variable, an interaction term,9 and a vector
of control variables. These variables include: the average growth in GDP from 19912010, the percentage of urbanized population in 2010,10 inequality,11 government
consumption,12 the corruption perception score from transparency international’s 2010
rankings, geography as measured by the log of the distance from the capital to
9

The interaction term consists of the formal score multiplied by the informal score.
Data for urbanization is gathered from the World Bank: World Development Indicators.
11
Inequality is proxied by the GINI coefficient of income inequality for 2010 and retrieved from the World
Bank: World Development Indicators.
12
Government consumption measures are gathered from the 2008 Fraser Institute index, Gwartney, Hall, &
Lawson (2008).
10
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Copenhagen, Denmark, and average years of schooling in 1960 as estimated by Barro
13

& Lee, (2010). Williamson had included a dummy variable for English legal origin as
well, but since none of the countries in my sample derived their legal system from the
common law tradition this variable is omitted. The composite scores used to measure
formal and informal institutions are only meant to be used as relative measures of
institutional strength. Since there is no common unit of measure only the ordinal
relationship is of any significance. The coefficients are therefore not to be interpreted as
representing marginal effects; only the signs and significance levels are of interest.
Column [1] only controls for formal institutions and shows that formal institutions
are negatively correlated with GDP per capita. The relationship, however, is not
significant. Column [2] only controls for informal institutions and is positively correlated
but also not significant. Column [3] controls for both formal and informal indices. Both
retain the same relationship with GDP per capita, and neither is significant. Column [4]
introduces a vector of control variables. None of the institutional measures emerge as
significant. Columns [5] and [6] control for the interaction term, with column [6]
including a vector of controls. In columns [7] and [8] the ratio term is regressed, both
with and without controls. Columns [9] and [10] breakout the component cultural
measures to see if each measure individually has any significance in predicting GDP per
capita performance. It is interesting to point out that the signs in column [9] correspond
with the directions laid out by Tabellini (2010), but when the controls are introduced in
[10] the signs change. This supports the idea that other regional factors might change
13

This measure of geography controls for both the latitudinal effects, which are well established in the
literature, but also for the beneficial historical and geographic effects of proximity to more developed
western nations which is unique to this region. Copenhagen, Denmark represents a point to the northwest,
the farther from which a country is, the lower its GDP per capita.
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Table 1: GDP Regressions
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita 2010 adjusted for PPP (in constant 2005 dollars)
[1]
Formal institutions

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

-0.027

-0.018

0.017

0.046

-0.093

(0.039)

(0.040)

(0.045)

(0.574)

(0.763)

0.178

0.164

-0.007

0.249

-0.167

(0.149)

(0.156)

(0.211)

(0.779)

(1.128)

-0.014

0.025

(0.129)

(0.170)

Informal institutions
Ratio formal/informal
Interaction
formal/informal
Tolerance
Obedience
Trust
Control
Growth
Urban Population
Inequality
Government
consumption
Corruption
Geography
Education
Coefficient
Observations

-0.007

0.003

(0.068)

(0.099)

-0.007

-0.006

(0.011)

(0.014)

0.016

0.015

(0.018)

(0.025)

-0.000

-0.000

(0.012)
0.026

(0.014)
0.031

(0.068)

(0.083)

-0.905

-0.874

(0.602)

(0.705)

0.070

0.057

(0.083)

(0.128)

4.220***

3.278***

3.453***

6.173*

3.071

6.844

(0.251)

(0.649)

(0.772)

(1.731)

(3.509)

(5.004)

19

19

19

15

19

15

R-squared

0.03

0.08

0.09

0.73

0.09

0.74

Adj. R-squared

-0.03

0.02

-0.03

0.25

-0.09

0.07

Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance level: *** at 0.1%; ** at 1%; * at 5%; ~ at 10%
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Table 1: GDP Regressions (continued)
Dependent variable: log GDP per capita 2010 adjusted for PPP (in constant 2005 dollars)
[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

Formal institutions
Informal institutions
Ratio formal/informal

-0.150

0.066

(0.150)

(0.132)

Interaction formal/informal
Tolerance
Obedience
Trust
Control
Growth
Urban Population
Inequality
Government consumption
Corruption
Geography
Education
Coefficient
Observations

0.007

-0.003

(1.143)

(0.009)

-0.003

0.014

(0.010)

(0.012)

0.012

-0.008

(0.012)

(0.021)

0.015

0.027

(0.014)

(0.028)

-0.006

-0.032

(0.059)

(0.081)

-0.007

0.004

(0.007)

(0.013)

0.016

0.023

(0.013)

(0.018)

0.000

-0.008

(0.011)

(0.015)

0.028

0.058

(0.058)

(0.091)

-0.882~

-0.749

(0.446)

(0.470)

0.068

0.068

(0.064)

(0.078)

4.271***

6.073**

2.488*

3.279

(0.226)

(1.532)

(1.143)

(3.000)

19

15

19

15

R-squared

0.06

0.73

0.13

0.84

Adj. R-squared

-0.00

0.38

-0.11

0.26

Standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance level: *** at 0.1%; ** at 1%; * at 5%; ~ at 10%
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the innate effect of these cultural traits on economic performance.
Clearly the formal and informal composite scores are not significant in explaining
variations in GDP per capita. Despite the information which the quadrant analysis
provides about the association of the various cultural measures and formal institutions, it
is clear that the relationships are not helpful in explaining the divergent economic
development in Eastern Europe. Since neither the composite scores for either cultural
indicators or formal institutions nor the interaction term are significant, I conclude that
there are other factors which explain the difference in outcomes among these
transitioning nations.
The final robustness check that Williamson performs is to examine the average
GDP per capita for the countries which lie in between her strong and weak boundaries to
see if they follow the same general trend as those in the extreme sectors. This check is
not relevant to my analysis since this paper uses quadrants to subdivide the cohorts
according to institutional strength.
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CONCLUSION

The results of the quadrant analysis suggest that in Eastern Europe the cultural
aspects measured in this paper have a different effect than in the world at large.
Expanding those results to examine each culture measure reveals that the interplay
between informal and formal institutions is much more nuanced than they appear to be on
the surface. Unfortunately, though some relative comparisons can be made regarding the
effectiveness of one institutional arrangement over another, the lack of statistical
significance in any of the robustness specifications implies that relative institutional
relationships are not significant in explaining the divergent economic development in
Eastern Europe.
There may be value in performing a more nuanced cultural analysis, taking into
account the specific regional complexities of Eastern Europe, but then any cross cultural
analysis becomes difficult. My results suggest that in different cultural contexts, the
same cultural traits might not have the same effect on economic performance, further
complicating any transnational comparison.
There are likely other factors which are of greater importance than the cultural
measures used by Tabellini (2010) in determining the success of a transitioning economy.
Further research is required to determine what these factors are and how transitional
economies evolve. Many of the former communist states still have legacies of the Soviet
Union present in their institutional composition. For instance, command and control
economic planning generated inefficient allocations of human and physical capital, which
in turn had an impact on the informal institutions in the region. A well-documented
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example is the thriving black market in the Soviet Union generated by the tight regulation
of commodities markets. A set of informal institutions evolved in order to regulate the
barter of goods and favors which remained even after the formal regulation of goods was
discontinued. These legacy institutions are not accurately reflected in the formal
institutional measures used in this paper and may have a significant impact on
productivity depending on the other informal institutions in the region.
For some of the sample countries similar formal and informal institutional
arrangements seem to generate highly variable outcomes, suggesting that there is much
more at play here. This is further supported by the fact that nations with a similar
institutional mix to those in my sample had a much higher variance of outcomes in GDP
per capita than other nations in the world according to Williamson (2009). This variance
might be symptomatic of this particular institutional structure.
With all this complexity it is little wonder that the idea of simply “getting the
institutions right” would have such a widely variable success rate.

These sorts of

interactions must be studied in greater depth if any conclusions are to be made regarding
why these transitional economies are defying consensus when it comes to the
determinants of economic growth.
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APPENDIX A. DATA

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
2010 GDP pc ppp in const 2005 dollars
log 2010 GDP pc ppp in const 2005
dollars
Tolerance
Obedience
Trust
Control
Plurality
Proportional Representation
Constitutional Review
Judicial Independence
Cultural Composite Score
Formal Composite Score
Ratio of Formal and Informal Scores

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

12984.126

2789.438

24982.474

4.054

3.446

4.398

60.670

40.467

74.157

26.500

13.467

38.952

23.582

12.121

43.920

63.238

40.838

72.707

0.508

0.000

1.000

60.670

40.467

74.157

26.500

13.467

38.952

23.582

12.121

43.920

63.238

40.838

72.707

0.508

0.000

1.000

0.914

0.000

1.000

2010 GDP pc ppp
in const 2005
dollars

4838.932
8918.713
12813.547
11486.358
16121.263
22557.463
16353.208
4550.186
16514.333
12938.018
15390.818
2789.438
8733.745
17336.670
10929.433
14182.558
19244.154
24982.474
6017.082

Country

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belerus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine

Plurality

Control

Trust

Obedience

Tolerance

log 2010 GDP pc
ppp in const 2005
dollars
1.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.500
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.857

Proportional
Representation

1.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.214
1.000
0.500
0.000
0.214
0.214
0.714
0.000
0.000
0.786

0.750
0.750
1.000
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.000
0.500
0.000
1.000
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.750

Constitutional
Review

65.041
40.838
59.274
58.221
70.569
67.835
63.107
58.602
64.099
61.355
66.914
72.707
69.015
63.176
67.919
58.832
66.442
69.906
57.665

0.875
0.375
0.168
0.793
0.458
0.583
0.333
0.333
0.625
0.625
0.793
0.918
0.833
0.000
0.918
0.375
0.208
0.583
0.418

Judicial
Independence

20.133
43.920
39.720
22.807
19.343
26.053
27.981
21.200
22.096
20.894
27.771
18.200
12.121
23.334
14.098
25.325
15.568
20.693
26.795

4.363
3.679
5.070
3.946
3.812
4.363
4.735
3.685
4.795
4.393
4.251
4.399
4.025
4.866
4.274
4.536
4.143
4.667
4.644

Cultural
Composite Score

22.467
14.684
36.760
17.883
22.112
20.469
25.177
13.467
38.952
22.998
20.153
32.333
24.307
33.956
28.999
31.968
31.338
27.238
38.231

9.063
5.313
5.419
5.731
7.394
7.706
4.581
7.081
7.813
5.848
8.231
4.794
5.831
3.036
7.829
6.473
4.269
5.206
7.026

Formal
Composite Score

66.867
47.708
67.040
58.913
40.467
60.158
73.152
54.133
66.657
70.456
55.202
52.733
55.577
74.157
59.925
65.335
52.364
68.829
63.064

2.077
1.444
1.069
1.453
1.939
1.766
0.967
1.922
1.629
1.331
1.936
1.090
1.449
0.624
1.832
1.427
1.030
1.116
1.513

Ratio of Formal
and Informal
Scores

3.685
3.950
4.108
4.060
4.207
4.353
4.214
3.658
4.218
4.112
4.187
3.446
3.941
4.239
4.039
4.152
4.284
4.398
3.779
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Table 3: Master Data Table
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APPENDIX B. DATA DESCRIPTIONS FROM SMITHEY & ISHIYAMA (2000)

Table 4: Conversions of Smithey & Ishiyama (2000) Variables
Composite
Variable
Constitutional
Review

Source
Variable
Can judicial
decision be
overturned

Constitutional
Review

Presence of a
priori review

Measures the extent of a priori review by the
judiciary, namely can the judiciary challenge the
constitutionality of statutes before they are applied.
If the judiciary has broad a priori review then that
country is assigned a 1. If a priori review is
restricted to certain policy areas such as treaties
then they are assigned a 0.5. Those countries
which have only incidental review are coded as 0.

Constitutional
Review

Previous
Judicial
Review

Dummy variable which is used as an independent
variable which is coded as 1 if there had been
constitutional review under the previous
communist regime and 0 if there had been no
tradition of judicial empowerment. Since the
objective of these variables is to measure the
institutions of each country, it stands to reason that
a tradition of constitutional review would have an
impact on the strength of constitutional review in
the current period.

Judicial
Independence

Judge's term
relative to
other political
actors

Determined by the relative length of a judicial term
of office to the terms of other actors in the
government. When a constitutional court judge’s
term is less than or equal to one term of the actor
with the longest term a 0 is assigned, 0.33 when
less than or equal to two parliamentary sessions,
0.66 when more than two parliamentary sessions
(but had constitutionally specified limit in the
number of terms), and 1 when the term ends with
death or voluntary retirement.

Data Description
Answers the question, “Can the judicial body
responsible for determining constitutionality have
its decisions overturned by other actors?” and is
coded as 0 if the court’s decisions can be
overturned and 1 if not.
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Judicial
Independence

How many
actors are
involved in
selection of
judges

Number of actors involved in the nomination and
confirmation process. Coded as 0 when there was
only one actor involved in the process, as 0.5 for
two actors, and as 1 for when three or more
institutional actors were involved in the process of
nomination and confirmation.

Judicial
Independence

Who
establishes
court
procedures

Judicial control of judicial procedure; who sets the
rules which determine the proceedings of court
cases? Coded as 0 if procedures were established
outside of the court and as 1 if procedures were
established by the court itself.

Judicial
Independence

Conditions for Degree of difficulty in removing judges from
judicial
office. Country cases received a score of 0 if
removal
judges may be removed for any reason loosely
described as violations of the law. Country cases
were scored a 0.5 if judges may only be removed
under specific conditions listed under the
constitution (such as for treason). The case was
scored a 1 if the constitution either guarantees that
judges cannot be removed for any reason, or if
there are no provisions for removal at all.

